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IPSO FACTO CLAUSES AND CHAPTER 7
BANKRUPTCIES: SUPERFLUOUS CONTRACT
PROVISIONS, ENFORCEABLE PRENUPTIALS,
OR CONTRARY TO THE FRESH START?
Once upon a time in America, a gentleman from Virginia
financed a shiny new Oldsmobile through a neighborhood bank,
thus becoming a debtor.' Sometime later, while the car loan was still
outstanding, the debtor's financial affairs took a turn for the worse,
prompting him to file a bankruptcy petition under chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 2 At the time of his bankruptcy
petition, the debtor was current on his monthly car payments to the
bank and was not otherwise in default—a rarity in chapter 7 pro-
ceedings at the time, but not an unprecedented scenario today. 3
Upon learning of the debtor's bankruptcy, the bank became
quite concerned. Although the debtor had made all of his payments
to date, the bank feared that he might not do so in the future.
Moreover, the bank realized that by filing bankruptcy the debtor
had reduced the legal remedies the bank could pursue if the debtor
eventually did default. No longer would the bank be able to collect
any outstanding balance from the debtor if he defaulted on the
loan because, after his discharge in bankruptcy, the debtor would
no longer be personally liable for the amount due. 4 Rather, the
bank's sole remedy in the event of a default by the debtor would
be to repossess the Oldsmobile and attempt to sell it for an amount
sufficient to cover the outstanding loan balance. 5
1 The text at notes 1-10 is adapted from In re Ballance, 33 Bankr. 89 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1983).
2 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
The Ballance court facetiously suggested that a chapter 7 debtor rarely enters bank-
ruptcy without having defaulted on an outstanding installment loan, such as a car loan. See
Ballance, 33 Bankr. at 89. This scenario is not as rare as the court might have imagined,
however, as numerous cases have arisen involving this same fact scenario. See, e.g., In re
Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1384 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1990); Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882
F.2d 1543, 1545 (10th Cir. 1989); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell, 700 F.2d 1053,
1054 (6th Cir. 1983).
4 In most chapter 7 cases, a debtor receives a discharge under section 727 at the close
of the bankruptcy proceedings. Discharge extinguishes the debtor's personal liability for most
pre-petition debt and permanently enjoins creditors from seeking recovery of such debt from
the debtor. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 524(a) (1988).
5 See Ballance, 33 Bankr. at 89. Although a debtor's personal liability is discharged in
bankruptcy, the creditor's lien survives the bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, after discharge the
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Recognizing that the Oldsmobile was not getting more valuable
with time, and fearing that the debtor might decide to discontinue
his payments when the car was no longer of much value, the bank
decided to repossess the car immediately unless the debtor exercised
a Bankruptcy Code remedy to retain it. The debtor, on the other
hand, wished to retain possession of the car by simply continuing
his contract payments as if his bankruptcy had never occurred.
Unable to reach a compromise, the parties brought their dispute
before a bankruptcy judge.
In a happy turn of events for the debtor, the bankruptcy judge
ruled in the 1983 case of In re Ballance that the debtor could retain
possession of the prized Oldsmobile so long as he fulfilled his con-
tractual obligations to the bank.' The judge ruled that a chapter 7
debtor who has not defaulted on an outstanding installment retail
contract cannot be forced to resort to a Bankruptcy Code remedy
in order to retain the collateral securing such a loan.' The judge
acknowledged that the debtor would no longer be personally liable
on the loan .and that, consequently, the bank's sole remedy upon
default would be to repossess a potentially depreciated Oldsmobile,
but the judge also noted that the debtor had not done anything
wrong.8
 "A debtor having filed bankruptcy has not committed a
cardinal sin," the judge declared.'" In addition, the judge advised
the bank that, as "bride to be," it should be grateful for a paying
customer.'° And thus our heroes were betrothed, presumably to
lead their lives happily ever after.
* * * * * * * * * *
In order to avert such shotgun marriages as the type consum-
mated in In re Ballance, creditors have resorted to including a sort
of prenuptial contract term known as an ipso facto clause in their
installment retail contracts. Ipso facto clauses, also known as "bank-
ruptcy clauses" or "default upon filing clauses," contractually pro-
vide that a debtor's bankruptcy filing will constitute default, thereby
accelerating the outstanding loan balance and triggering the cred-
creditor can proceed in rem against its collateral to enforce its lien. See In re Crouch, 104
Bankr. 770,772-73 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1989).
See Ballance, 33 Bankr. at 91.
See id, at 90-91.
See id. at 91.
9 Id.
io Id.
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itor's default remedies, including the remedy of repossession." To
the extent that ipso facto clauses are enforceable, a debtor who has
not otherwise defaulted on an installment retail contract is forced
to resort to a Bankruptcy Code remedy in order to avert creditor
repossession efforts.r2
A significant division exists among the courts regarding the
enforceability of ipso facto clauses in chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy
proceedings. A number of courts have held such clauses invalid,
ruling that it would be contrary to the policies of the bankruptcy
law to require non-defaulting debtors to resort to the Bankruptcy
Code remedies in order to retain their liened property after bank-
ruptcy." Other courts have held ipso facto clauses enforceable, rea-
soning that the risks that accompany the loss of a debtor's personal
liability on an installment loan warrant a creditor's use of an ipso
facto clause to protect its interest in the collateral securing such a
loan." Still other courts have suggested that ipso facto clauses are
superfluous, holding that the Bankruptcy Code itself requires all
debtors, defaulting and non-defaulting alike, to resort to one of the
Code remedies in order to retain liened collateral after bank-
ruptcy."
The language of ipso facto clauses varies. The following are two noteworthy examples:
"Default—You will be in default if you die, file for bankruptcy, or become insolvent . ." In
re West, 101 Bankr. 648, 649 (D. Colo. 1989), aff 'd, Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882
F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1989); "Ulf Customer-Debtor becomes voluntary[sic] or involuntary[sic]
bankrupt . . . then in any of the aforesaid cases all installments of said note shall, at the
option of the Secured Party, without notice of said option to anyone become at once due
and payable . . ." In re Whately, 16 Bankr. 394, 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
' 2 See generally In re Schweitzer, 19 Bankr. 860, 865, 868 (Bankr, E.D.N.Y, 1982), In
Chapter 7 proceedings, section 722 redemption and section 524(c) reaffirmation are the
Code remedies available to the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 722, 524(a) (1988). For a discussion
of these remedies, see infra notes 21-53 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., In re Peacock, 87 Bankr. 657, 659 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (ipso facto clauses
penalize debtors for exercising right to file bankruptcy and frustrate debtors' fresh start); In
re Winters, 69 Bankr. 145, 147 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986) (refusing to enforce ipso facto clause);
In re Brock, 23 Bankr. 999, 1002 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1982) (insolvency clauses are not Favored
under the Code's fresh start policy).
See, e,g,, In re Mitchell, 85 Bankr. 564, 565-66 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1988) (ipso facto clause
enforceable); In re Morrow, 66 Bankr. 162, 163 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (same); In re Sparago,
31 Bankr. 552, 554 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); Schweitzer, 19 Bankr. at 868 (ipso facto
clause enforced, clauses are not per se valid); In re Whately, 16 Bankr. 394, 398 (Bankr, N.D.
Ohio 1982) (ipso facto clause enforceable).
13 See, e,g„ In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that 11 U.S.C.
521(2) requires all Chapter 7 debtors to choose between exercising a Code remedy or
surrendering secured collateral); In re Chavarria, 117 Bankr, 582, 585 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1990) (same), But see Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1989)
("nothing within the Code makes [redemption or reaffirmation] exclusive").
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This note considers the enforceability of ipso facto clauses in
chapter 7 proceedings. Section I examines the Code remedies of
redemption and reaffirmation that ipso facto clauses attempt to trig-
ger.' 6
 This section briefly discusses the legislative history of the Code
remedies and examines their procedural requirements as well. Sec-
tion II considers whether the Code requires all chapter 7 debtors
to resort to the Code remedies in order to retain liened property
after bankruptcy or whether the Code only imposes this require-
ment on debtors who enter bankruptcy in default." Section III
examines whether creditors can enforce ipso facto clauses to limit a
debtor's options for retaining liened property to the Code remedies
of redemption and reaffirmation."' This section focuses on the var-
ious policy considerations that courts have cited in deciding whether
to enforce ipso facto clauses. Section IV analyzes whether the Code
itself requires debtors to resort to the Code remedies, concluding
that the Code does not expressly impose this requirement.'° This
section further analyzes whether creditors can force debtors to re-
sort to the Code remedies by enforcing ipso facto clauses, concluding
that ipso facto clauses should be enforced in chapter 7 proceedings. 2°
Finally, section V suggests that Congress should enact two amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Code to eliminate the confusion regarding
a debtor's options in bankruptcy and to enhance the Code remedies
that are available to chapter 7 debtors.
I. THE CODE REMEDIES: REDEMPTION AND REAFFIRMATION
The Bankruptcy Code provides two alternative remedies by
which a chapter 7 debtor can retain possession of liened property
after bankruptcy. Under section 722, a debtor can redeem such
property by paying the creditor the fair market value of the prop-
erty or, if less, the remaining loan balance due." Section 722 re-
16 See infra notes 21-53 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 79-149 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 151-165 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 166-186 and accompanying text.
21 Section 722 provides in relevant part:
An individual debtor may, whether or not such debtor has waived such
right, redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, fam-
ily, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt . .
by paying the holder of such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of
such holder that is secured by such lien.
11 U.S.C. 722 (1988).
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demption requires a lump-sum payment and the remedy is available
to the debtor as a matter of right. 22
Alternatively, under section 524(c), the debtor can enter into a
reaffirmation agreement with the creditor, pledging to repay in
installments all or part of the outstanding loan balance in exchange
for the continued right to possession of the liened collateral." A
reaffirmation gives rise to renewed personal liability on the part of
the debtor and can be enforced against the debtor notwithstanding
his or her discharge from bankruptcy. 24 In addition, reaffirmation
under section 524(c) requires a voluntary agreement between debt-
ors and creditors. Thus, debtors cannot exercise this remedy with-
out first obtaining creditor consent."
A. Commission's Proposals
The Bankruptcy Code remedies of redemption and reaffir-
mation are somewhat different from the debtor remedies that were
proposed to Congress by the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States ("the Commission") that drafted the original ver-
sion of the 1978 Act. 26
 Citing the potential for creditor over-reach-
ing in obtaining reaffirmations, 27
 the Commission recommended
22
 Section 722 itself indicates that the remedy is available to a debtor as a matter of
right, providing that a debtor may redeem "whether or not such debtor has waived such
right." 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1988) (emphasis added). Although the statute itself does not indicate
what form of payment section 722 requires, courts have consistently construed section 722
as requiring a lump-sum payment. For a discussion of these opinions, see infra notes 38-53
and accompanying text.
23 Section 524(c) provides in relevant part:
An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration
for which, in whole or in part. is based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case
under this title is enforceable only to any extent enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived .
II	 § 524(c) (1988).
24
 See id.; see also In re Hunter, 121 Bankr. 609, 612 (Bankr. D. Ala. 1990).
25 See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell, 700 F.2d 1053, 1056 (6th Cir. 1983)
("[section] 524(c) envisions execution of an 'agreement' which, by definition is a voluntary
undertaking").
Congress established the Commission in 1970 to "analyze, evaluate, and recommend
changes to" the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. Pub. L. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 545, 545.
" The Commission reported that, under prior law, creditors were often able to use
coercive tactics, such as the threat of repossession, in obtaining reaffirmations from debtors.
See REPORT OE THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, KR.
Doe. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. I, at 10, 169 (1973) 'hereinafter "COMMISSION'S
REPORT Part Often, the Commission noted, the value of a debtor's personal property was
much greater to the debtor, due to high replacement costs, than the price it would bring to
the creditor at a foreclosure sale. See REPORT OF Tuk: COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
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that reaffirmation agreements be disallowed under the Bankruptcy
Code" and that debtors be provided with a redemption remedy
instead. 29
 The Commission's proposed redemption provision pro-
vided debtors with two alternatives." Under the first alternative, a
debtor could redeem encumbered property by tendering a lump-
sum payment to the creditor for the fair market value of the prop-
erty or the amount of the creditor's claim, whichever was less. 3 '
This remedy was to be available to the debtor as a matter of right
and would not require the creditor's consent. 32
Alternatively, a debtor could enter into a consensual agreement
with the creditor to redeem the collateral in installment payments."
Such installment redemption agreements were to be enforceable
against the debtor notwithstanding his or her discharge from bank-
ruptcy, but the debt incurred by the debtor under such agreements
OF TnE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess., Part 11, at 131 n.1
[hereinafter "CommissioN's REPoi•r Part In, Consequently, even when actual repossession
was of little value to the creditor, the threat of repossession was sufficient to coerce the debtor
into reaffirming. See id. When the debt that arose form such agreements exceeded the actual
value of the collateral, the debtor lost the benefits of discharge and the fresh start that
discharge was intended to provide. Id.
2" See COMMISSION'S REPORT Part I, supra note 27, at 169; see also COIVIMISSION'S REPORT
Part 11, supra note 27, at 142 (Commission's proposed section 4-507). The Commission's
proposed section 4-507 specifically prohibited reaffirmations, providing;
(a) Revival or Reaffirmation of a Debt Extinguished by Discharge.
. . . a debt extinguished by discharge .	 shall not be revived or reaffirmed or be all or
part of any bargain creating a new debt.
COMMISSION'S REPORT Part II, supra note 27, at 142.
See CommissioN's REpoirr Part I, supra note 27, at 173; COMMISSION'S REPORT Part II,
supra note 27, at 130-131 (Commission's proposed section 4-504).
" The Commission's proposed section 4-504 provided;
(a) Right to Redeem. The debtor may redeem property from a lien securing
a dischargeable consumer debt, provided the property is exempt or has been
abandoned by the trustee, by paying the holder of the lien the fair market value
of the property or, if less, the amount of his claim.
(b) Enforcement of Agreement to Redeem. An agreement providing for the
redemption of property by the bankrupt under subdivision (a) may be enforced
against the debtor. A party to the agreement may File a complaint with the court
for a determination that the agreement was entered in good faith and in
conformity with this Act.
COMMISSION'S REPORT Part II, supra note 27, at 130-31.
31 Id. at 131 (Commission's proposed section 4-504(a)); see also COMMISSION'S REPORT
Part I, supra note 27, at 180 n.42 (recognizing that the Commission's proposed section 504(a)
contemplated a lump-sum payment).
'2 See COMMISSION'S REPORT Part II, supra note 27, at 131 (Commission's proposed
section 4-504(b)); see also id. at 131 n.2.
" See Id. at 131 (Commission's proposed section 4-504(b)); see also COMMISSION'S REPORT
Part 1, supra note 27, at 174.
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was not to exceed the lesser of the fair market value of the property
or the amount of the creditor's claim. 54
After significant deliberation, Congress rejected the Commis-
sion's recommendation that reaffirmations be prohibited under the
1978 Act.• Congress did, however, impose certain restrictions on
the use of reaffirmations in order to protect debtors from burden-
some agreements." In addition, Congress adopted the Commis-
sion's recommendation that debtors be provided with a redemption
remedy. This remedy is set forth in section 722.' 7
B. Installment Redemption versus Lump - Sum Redemption
In enacting section 722, Congress failed to specify whether that
section requires debtors to tender a lump-sum payment in order to
exercise their section 722 redemption rights or whether debtors can
redeem in installment payments as well." One or two early cases
addressing this issue held that installment redemption is permitted
under section 722." The vast majority of courts, however, have held
that section 722 requires a lump-sum payment: 1 °
One reason courts have cited for refusing to permit installment
redemption under section 722 is that chapter 7 lacks the necessary
procedural mechanisms for enforcing installment redemption
54 See COMMISSION'S REcoRr Part II, supra note 27, at 131 (Commission 's proposed
section 4-504(b); see also COMMISSION'S REPORT Part 1, supra note 27, at 174.
55 See generally In re Cruseturner, 8 Bankr. 581, 586-87 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
'" Prior to 1984, section 524(c) required debtors to obtain court approval of reaffirmation
agreements. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95 -598, § 524(c)(4), 92 Slat.. 2549,
2592 (1978) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 529(c) (1988)). Section 524(c)(4) provided that
the court had to approve the agreement as "not imposing an undue hardship on ihe debtor
or a dependent of the debtor, and . . . in the hest interest of the debtor . . . ."
§ 524 (c)(4)(A)(i)—(ii).
Under the current provision, a reaffirmation agreement most provide the debtor the
option to rescind within 60 days. Also, the debtor's counsel must submit an affidavit to the
court stipulating that the agreement is voluntary and does not impose an undue burden on
the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(2), (3) (1988).
57 I I	 § 722 (1988).
'8 See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell. 700 F.2d 1053, 1055 (Gth Cir. 1983)
("[section[ 722 is facially silent as to the mechanics of redemption and, particularly, on
whether redemption may be accomplished through installment payments").
59 See, e.g., In re Clark, 10 Bankr. 605, 607 (Bankr. C.D. 111. 1981) (permitting installment
redemption); In re Carroll, 7 Bankr. 907, 910 (Bankr. D. Ariz.) (permitting installment
redemption), relic' 11 Bankr. 725, 726 (Bifikr. 9th Cir. 1981).
" See, e.g., Bell, 700 F.2d at 1058; In re Schweitzer, 19 Bankr. 860, 864 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1982); In re Cruseturner, 8 Bankr. 581, 582 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
710	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:703
plans.'" Unlike chapter 13, which allows a debtor to redeem in
installments but which postpones the debtor's discharge until all
payments under the plan are completed, chapter 7 makes no pro-
vision for postponing the debtor's discharge." Consequently, under
a chapter 7 installment redemption scheme, the debtor's installment
payment schedule would likely extend beyond discharge, after
which the debtor could discontinue the installment payments with-
out encountering personal liability." Thus, because installment re-
demption would expose the creditor to the risk of default, leaving
the creditor with repossession of a potentially worthless collateral
as its only recourse, a number of courts have required a lump-sum
payment under section 722. 44
For example, in the 1982 case of In re Hart, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York held that a
lump-sum payment was required under section 722 in order to
ensure a creditor's recovery of its secured claim. 46 In Hart, the
bankruptcy court had permitted the debtor to redeem her auto-
mobile by paying its $2,200 fair market value in monthly install-
ments of $100. 46
 The district court reversed, holding that section
722 requires a lump-sum payment. 47
In requiring lump-sum redemption under section 722, the Hart
court first determined that the value of a secured creditor's claim
should be fixed as of the date of the debtor's bankruptcy filing."
The court further noted that Congress had taken measures in sev-
eral sections of the Code to ensure the secured creditor full recovery
of its secured claim. 49
 The court then addressed whether the bank-
" See, e.g., Bell, 700 F.2d at 1056 (chapter 7 bankruptcy is "ill-equipped" to implement
installment redemption); In re Cruseturner, 8 Bankr. at 588 ("Chapter 7 bankruptcies are
just not equipped with the procedure to enforce redemptions in installments."). In addition
to citing the absence of enforcement mechanisms, a number of courts have noted that if
debtors could redeem in installments under section 722 there would be no reason to enter
into a section 524(c) reaffirmation, as installment redemption would invariably be a more
attractive option to the debtor. See, e.g., Bell, 700 F.2d at 1056; In re Hart, 8 Bankr. 1020,
1022 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
" See In re Schweitzer, 19 Bankr. at 864 n.7 (contrasting chapter 13's redemption scheme,
which is set forth at 11 U.S.C. §1 1325(a)(5), 1322(c), and 1328(a), with chapter 7's redemption
scheme).
" See id.
44 See, e.g., Bell, 700 F.2d at 1056; Hart, 8 Bankr. at 1023.
" 8 Bankr. 1020, 1023 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
4i' Id. at 1021.
47 Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1022.
49 Id. The Hari court cited several Code sections in support of its conclusion that
Congress intended to protect the interest of a secured creditor in recovering the full value "
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ruptcy court's installment redemption order would ensure the cred-
itor such recovery.
The Hart court found that the bankruptcy court's order did
not adequately ensure that the creditor would recover the full value
of its secured claim. 50 In particular, the court considered the con-
sequences that would result if the debtor discontinued her install-
ment payments after discharge. If such a default were to occur six
months after discharge, the court hypothesized, it was likely that
the car securing the loan balance would have depreciated more
than the $600 paid to the creditor under the installment redemption
plan.51 Consequently, even after repossessing the car, the creditor's
total recovery under the installment redemption scheme would be
less than if the debtor had been required to redeem in a lump-sum
payment during the bankruptcy proceeding. 52 Thus, because Con-
gress had sought to preserve the claims of secured creditors in
bankruptcy, and because installment redemption would potentially
undermine this objective, the Hart court concluded that section 722
requires a lump-sum payment.
Today it is well-settled that section 722 requires a lump-sum
payment." In part, courts have come to this conclusion because of
the risks that installment redemption would pose to creditors. For
debtors who are unable or unwilling to redeem under section 722,
the Code provides the alternative remedy of reaffirmation. Al-
though this remedy was opposed by the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws, Congress chose to allow reaffirmation agreements, subject to
certain restrictions, under section 524(c).
IL THE DEBATE: WHEN ARE THE CODE REMEDIES NECESSARY?
Although the procedural requirements of section 722 and sec-
tion 524(c) are no longer much in doubt, considerable controversy
of its secured claim. For example, the court noted that section 725 requires the trustee to
dispose of licned property for the benefit of secured creditors before disposing of the
property of the estate. In addition, the court noted that under section 554(b), a creditor can
petition the court to order the trustee to abandon rapidly depreciating collateral that is of
inconsequential value to the estate. Finally, the court cited a House Report that indicated
that, once a creditor's secured claim is determined, the court is required to ensure that the
creditor's collateral is not eroded by delay or use by the estate. Id.
55 See id. at 1022-23.
51 Id.
32 See id. at 1023.
55 See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell, 700 F.2d 1053, 1056 (6th Cir.
1983); Hart, 8 Bankr. at 1023; In re Schweitzer, 19 Bankr, 860, 862 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982);
In re Whately, 16 Bankr. 394, 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); see also In re Pendlebury, 94
Bankr. 120, 122 (1988); In re Peacock, 87 Bankr. 657, 660 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
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exists as to when a debtor must resort to these Bankruptcy Code
remedies. Specifically, courts are divided as to whether the Code
requires all chapter 7 debtors to redeem or reaffirm in order to
retain liened collateral or whether the Code only imposes this re-
quirement on debtors who enter bankruptcy in default. 54 The Code
section at the center of this debate is section 521(2).
Section 521(2)(A) requires every chapter 7 debtor to file a
statement of intention with respect to his or her liened property,
indicating whether the debtor intends to retain or surrender the
property and, "if applicable," whether the debtor intends to redeem
or reaffirm. 55
 Section 521(2)(B) further requires the debtor to per-
form his or her stated intention within forty-five days of filing a
statement under section 521(2)(A). 5° Finally, section 521(2)(C) pro-
vides that a debtor's rights to the liened property are not altered
by subparagraphs (A) and (B). 57
Some courts have held that section 521(2) sets forth the exclu-
sive means by which a debtor can retain possession of property that
secures an outstanding installment loan." For example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in the 1990
" Compare In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990) (section 521(2) requires
all debtors to choose between redeeming, reaffirming, or surrendering their collateral) and
In re Chavarria, 117 Bankr. 582, 584-85 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990) (same) with Lowry Fed.
Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1989) (Bankruptcy Code does not
make redemption or reaffirmation exclusive means of retaining liened collateral) and In re
Belanger, 118 Bankr. 368, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990) (chapter 7 debtor has alternatives
other than the Code remedies). See also Bell, 700 F.2d at 1058 (suggesting that redemption
and reaffirmation are Chapter 7 debtors' only alternatives for retaining liened collateral after
bankruptcy).
" 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) (1988). Section 521(2) provides:
(2) if an individual debtor's schedule of assets and liabilities includes consumer
debts which are secured by property of the estate-
(A) ... the debtor shall file ... a statement of his intention with respect to
the retention or surrender of such property and, if applicable, specifying that
such property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem such
property, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such property;
(B) within forty-five days after the filing of a notice of intent under this
section, or within such additional time as the court . . . fixes, the debtor shall
perform his intention with respect to such property, as specified by subpara-
graph (A) of this paragraph; and
(C) nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of' this paragraph shall alter the
debtor's .. • rights with regard to such property
Id.
56 Id. § 521(2)(B).
57 Id. § 521(2)(C).
58 See, e.g., In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Chavarria, 1 l7
Bankr. 582, 584-85 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990).
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case of In re Edwards that section 521(2) requires all debtors to
choose between redeeming, reaffirming or surrendering liened col-
latera1. 6° In Edwards, the debtor had two automobile loans outstand-
ing at the time she filed bankruptcy. 6° Edwards was not in default
on either loan and she sought to retain the vehicles by continuing
her contract payments without reaffirming the underlying loans.
Relying in part on the language of section 521(2), the Edwards
court held that the options outlined in section 521(2) are exclusive'
The court noted that the language of section 521(2) is mandatory
in that it states that a debtor "shall file" a statement of intention
with respect to liened collateral." 2 The court further noted that
section 521(2)(B) contemplates that the debtor "shall perform" one
of the alternatives outlined in section 521(2)(A). 63 These alterna-
tives, the court observed, did not include a payment scheme of the
sort proposed by Edwards.
In addition to concluding that Edwards's proposed payment
scheme did not satisfy the language of section 521(2), the Edwards
court also determined that Edwards's proposal was contrary to the
purposes of that section as well. Noting that Congress added section
521(2) to the Code as part of the Consumer Finance Amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code, the Edwards court observed that one pur-
pose of these amendments was to protect creditors from the risks
associated with rapidly depreciating collateral." Permitting Edwards
to retain the vehicles without personal liability would potentially
undermine this objective, the court reasoned, because without per-
sonal liability for the loans Edwards would have little incentive to
maintain or insure the vehicles. If the value of the vehicles fell
below the level of the loan balance, the court noted, the creditor
would be left undersecured. The court concluded that Congress's
goal of protecting creditors from depreciation of their assets sup-
ported the conclusion that section 521(2) sets forth the exclusive
remedies for retaining liened collateral.°
In contrast to the Edwards court, some courts have held that
the options outlined in section 521(2) are not exclusive. 66 For ex-
59 901 F.2d at 1387.
Id, at 1384.
6 ' Id. at 1387.
62
 Id. at 1386.
" Id.
Id.
" See id. at 1386-87.
66 See, e.g., In re Hunter, 121 Bankr. 609, 617 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1990) (non-defaulting
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ample, in the 1990 case of In re Belanger, the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held that
chapter 7 debtors who had not defaulted on an outstanding install-
ment loan had the option of retaining the loan's collateral by simply
continuing their contract payments.° In Belanger, the collateral at
issue was the debtors' residence, a mobile home. 68
The debtors in Belanger had remained current on their mobile
home payments despite their financial difficulties. Upon entering
bankruptcy, the Belangers filed a statement of intention pursuant
to section 521(2)(A) indicating that they intended to retain the
mobile home. The Belangers did not indicate, however, whether
they intended to redeem the mobile home or reaffirm the under-
lying loan. Rather, the Belangers proposed to retain the property
by simply keeping their payments current. 69
In considering whether the Belangers had satisfied the require-
ments of section 521(2), the Belanger court construed that section
as imposing two independent requirements. First, the court deter-
mined that section 521(2) requires every debtor to file a statement
of intention indicating whether he or she intends to retain or sur-
render the collateral in question. 7° The court noted that the Belan-
gers had complied with this requirement. 7 ' Second, the court con-
cluded that section 521(2) requires a debtor to indicate whether he
or she intends to redeem, reaffirm or surrender the collateral, but
only if one of these options is "applicable." 72 In Belanger, the court
noted, none of these options was applicable because the Belangers
did not intend to redeem, reaffirm or surrender the collateral."
Rather, they intended to retain the mobile home by keeping their
contract payments current. 74
 The court thus concluded that the
debtors had satisfied the literal requirements of section 521(2).
The Belanger court also determined that the purposes of section
521(2) did not necessitate the conclusion that the remedies outlined
in that section are exclusive. The court observed that the primary
debtors can retain collateral under section 521(2)(A) without redeeming or reaffirming); In
re Belanger, 118 Bankr. 368, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990) (same); In re Peacock, 87 Bankr.
657, 660 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (same).
67
 118 Bankr. at 372.
66 Id. at 369.
69 Id.
72
 See id. at 369.
7L
72 See id. at 369-70.
n Id.
r4 Id.
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purpose of section 521(2) was to ensure that the secured creditor
receive notice of a debtor's intentions with respect to the creditor's
collatera1. 75 Thus, the court reasoned, when a debtor intends to
redeem, reaffirm or surrender the creditor's collateral, section 521
requires the debtor to notify the creditor of this intention. But, the
court held that section 521 was not intended to limit a debtor's
options to the options listed in the statute. 76 The court concluded
that chapter 7 debtors have other options as well, including the
continued contract payment option that the Belangers intended to
pursue.
Finally, the Belanger court addressed the concern raised by the
Seventh Circuit in In re Edwards that without personal liability debt-
ors will lack incentive to insure or maintain a creditor's collateral. 77
The court concluded that there was little basis for this concern in
Belanger because the collateral in question was the debtors' home.
The court reasoned that it was unlikely that the debtors would fail
to insure and maintain their home simply because they were no
longer personally liable on the loan. Moreover, the court noted that
if the debtors did fail to maintain or insure the collateral the creditor
would be justified in declaring a default and exercising its default
remedies. The court therefore concluded that the debtors could
retain the mobile home by keeping their contract payments cur-
rent. 78
In sum, courts are divided over whether section 521(2) sets
forth the exclusive means by which a debtor can retain possession
of liened collateral after bankruptcy. This split of authority sterns
in part from the "if applicable" language in section 521(2)(A) itself.
75 Id. at 370.
' 0 See id. at 372.
"
78 Id. If the Edwards and Belanger decisions fall on opposite ends of' a continuum, the
1989 decision of Lowry Federal Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1989), falls
somewhere in the middle. In Lowry, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that section 521 requires every debtor to elect between redeeming or reaffirming in
order to retain liened collateral. Id. at 1545 & n.2. The court rejected the debtor's argument
that the "if applicable" phrase in section 521(2)(A) gives debtors options other than the Code
remedies. Id. at 1545 n.2. But the Lowry court also noted that the Code does not provide any
mechanism by which the trustee or a creditor can compel the debtor to comply with section
521. Id. at 1545-46. Because the Code lacks such an enforcement mechanism, the Lowry
court reasoned that a bankruptcy court has discretion whether to compel debtors to comply
with section 521(2) or to allow them to pursue other remedies as well. See id. at 1546-47. In
Lowry, the bankruptcy court had permitted the debtors to retain the collateral by continuing
their contract payments without reaffirming. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that it
could not hold that the bankruptcy court had acted without authority. Id, at 1547.
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But the division among the courts appears to run deeper than a
disagreement over principles of statutory construction. Courts are
also divided over whether limiting a non-defaulting debtor's options
to the Code remedies is consistent with bankruptcy policy.
III. FORCING THE ISSUE: IPSO FACTO CLAUSES
In order to overcome the absence of a clear Code directive
triggering the redemption, reaffirmation or repossession scenario
in chapter 7 cases involving non-defaulting debtors, creditors have
attempted to create the necessary default by employing ipso facto
clauses in their installment retail contracts. Ipso facto clauses purport
to place debtors in default upon filing bankruptcy, thereby trigger-
ing creditor repossession rights. Such clauses not only raise the issue
of whether a creditor can actually repossess, however. Ipso facto
clauses also call into question whether creditors can use the threat
of repossession as a means of persuading a debtor to redeem or
reaffirm. Courts are divided over whether ipso facto clauses can be
enforced at all.
A. Code Restrictions on Pre-Discharge Enforcement of Ipso Facto
Clauses
The division among the courts concerning the enforceability of
ipso facto clauses has generally focused on whether such clauses can
be enforced after a debtor's discharge. This focus is likely due
to the fact that prior to discharge the Code presents a number
of barriers to the enforceability of ipso facto clauses." Perhaps the
7° In addition to section 362(d), discussed infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text,
section 541(c) also calls into question whether ipso facto clauses are enforceable in chapter 7
bankruptcy proceedings. Section 541(c) provides that all of a debtor's nonexempt assets
become property of the bankruptcy estate upon the debtor's filing of bankruptcy, notwith-
standing any ipso facto clause to the contrary. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1988). In the 1983 case
of General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit indicated that section 541(c)'s prohibition against ipso facto clauses was only intended
to ensure the ability of the bankruptcy trustee to collect chapter 7 debtors' property for
disposition. Once the property has been collected for the estate and subsequently abandoned
to the debtor, the court held, section 541(c)'s prohibition on ipso facto clauses is no longer
operative. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell, 700 F.2d 1053, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983).
Not all courts have embraced the Bell court's analysis of section 541(c)'s impact on ipso
facto clauses. lri 1983 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
held in In re Ballance that ipso facto clauses do not recover from section 541(c)'s initial
invalidation. 33 Bankr. 89, 90 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983). Without analysis, the Ballance court
rejected as "utterly ridiculous" the idea that ipso facto clauses "breathe new life" after initial
invalidation under section 541(c). Id, at 90. Accord In re Kunstler, 38 Bankr. 207, 209-10
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most formidable of these barriers is section 362's automatic
stay."
The automatic stay is triggered immediately upon a debtor's
bankruptcy filing and shields the debtor from all creditor recovery
efforts, including repossession, during the administration of the
bankruptcy cases' Professor White aptly noted the breadth of the
protections afforded by the stay, stating that "[ulpon filing of the
petition the creditor may continue to eat, sleep, and breathe; per-
haps he can smile at the debtor, but he may do little else." 82 As part
of that "little else," a creditor can motion to lift the stay pursuant
to section 362(d). 88 This motion presents one opportunity for cred-
itors to enforce ipso facto clauses.
Section 362(d)(1) provides that a creditor can motion to lift the
stay for "cause," including a lack of adequate protection of its in-
(M.D. La. 1984) (stating in dicta that section 524(c) renders ipso facto clauses void and "not
simply unenforceable until abandonment").
In addition to section 541, some courts have addressed whether section 365 precludes
creditors from enforcing ipso facto clauses in installment retail contracts. See, e.g., In re Rose,
21 Bankr. 272, 274-75 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982); In re Whately, 16 Bankr. 394, 397-98 (1982).
Section 365 invalidates ipso facto clauses in executory contracts. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
Courts have generally agreed that installment retail contracts such as car loans do not
constitute executory contracts within the meaning of section 365. See Rose, 2i Bankr. at 274-
75; Whately, 16 Bankr. at 397-98. Some courts, however, have indicated that even though
section 365 might not directly invalidate ipso facto clauses in installment retail contracts, that
section, along with section 541 and section 363(1), which provides that the trustee can use,
lease, or sell certain property of the estate notwithstanding any ipso facto clause to the contrary,
see 11 U.S.C. § 363(1) (1988), evinces a congressional policy disfavoring the use of ipso facto
clauses in Bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Brock, 23 Bankr. 998, 1003 & n.10; Rose, 21 Bankr. at
275-76.
H0
 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). Section 362 provides in relevant part:
(a) . . . a petition filed under .... this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to
all entities, of —
(5) any act to . . . enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the
extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of
the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case tinder this title ... .
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
"I Id.
"2 J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITOR'S RIGHTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 97 (1985).
" 3 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988) provides:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court
shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section,
such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay —
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property of such party in interest . . .
Id.
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terest in property." In the 1984 case of Riggs National Bank of
Washington v. Perry, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit addressed whether a default predicated on a debtor's
breach of an ipso facto clause constituted "cause" within the meaning
of section 362(d)(1). 85
 The court concluded that such a default did
not constitute "cause" and the court further stated that ipso facto
clauseS are unenforceable as a matter of law. 86
The creditor in Perry, Riggs National Bank of Washington
("Riggs"), held a security interest in Perry's Audi sedan, 87 In at-
tempting to persuade the court to lift the automatic stay, Riggs
argued that by filing bankruptcy Perry had breached the default-
upon-filing clause in the parties' security agreement. This default,
Riggs argued, constituted "cause" within the meaning of section
362(d)(1) and warranted modification of the automatic stay. 88
The Perry court denied Riggs's motion to lift the stay, noting
that the protections of the automatic stay constitute an essential step
in a debtor's journey toward a fresh start after bankruptcy. 89
 If the
filing of bankruptcy could alone suffice as "cause" justifying a mod-
ification of the automatic stay, the court reasoned, a debtor could
not file bankruptcy to seek the protections of the stay without con-
currently triggering its demise. 9° The court thus concluded that the .
ipso facto clause was unenforceable as a matter of law. 9 '
In addition to holding that the filing of bankruptcy could not
constitute "cause" within the meaning of section 362(d)(1), the Perry
court also concluded that the automatic stay would continue in
effect until Perry's discharge was granted or denied, thus providing
him with the opportunity to redeem or reaffirm. 92
 The court rea-
soned that Perry's continued contract payments would adequately
protect Riggs' interest in its collateral during the bankruptcy pro-
84 Id.
85
 729 F.2d. 982,984-85 (4th Cir. 1984).
8' Id.
87 Id. at 984.
8' Id.
89 Id.
9° Id. at 984-85.
5°
 Id. at 985.
92 See id, at 986. Riggs had also argued that it was entitled to relief from the stay because
its collateral was inadequately protected. See Perry, 729 F.2d at 985-86. Riggs cited the
prospect of Perry's discharge, as well as the possibility that its collateral could depreciate, in
support of this motion. The court rejected Riggs's argument, however, stating that Riggs's
position was "no more fragile, due to the Chapter 7 filing alone, than that of any lender
under an installment sales contract." Id. at 984.
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ceeding."3 The court, however, expressly withheld judgment on
whether Perry would be required to redeem or reaffirm in order
to retain possession of his car after the termination of the automatic
stay." Thus, although the Perry court stated that ipso facto clauses
are unenforceable as a matter of law, the Perry court only addressed
the more limited issue of whether such clauses can be enforced
during the automatic stay. 95
Other courts are in accord with the Perry court's conclusion
that the automatic stay precludes creditors from enforcing ipso facto
clauses during the pendency of a debtor's discharge."' Despite re-
peated assertions by creditors that adequate protection is lacking
when a debtor fails to redeem or reaffirm, courts have generally
agreed that a debtor's continued contract payments adequately pro-
tect a creditor during the automatic stay."' The automatic stay,
however, only continues in effect until discharge."' Thus, even
though a creditor can do little more than smile at the debtor while
93 See id. at 985-86.
94 Id. at 986.
95 In a separate opinion, Judge Widener emphasized that the court had not ruled on
the ultimate validity of the ipso facto clause. Judge Widener stated that the court's ruling that
the ipso facto clause was unenforceable extended only to enforcement attempts during the
bankruptcy case. After the stay was lifted and the bankruptcy case closed, Judge Widener
reasoned, the ultimate validity of the ipso facto clauses would be a matter of state law. See Id.
at 986-87 (Widener, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
96 See generally In re Wilson, 97 Bankr, 285, 286-88 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1989) (noting that
ipso facto clauses are not enforceable during the automatic stay); cf. General Motors Accep-
tance Corp. v. Bell, 700 1:.2d 1053, 1057 (6th Cir. 1983) (automatic stay continues in effect
until the case is closed, dismissed, or discharge is granted or denied); In re Cruseturner, 8
Bankr. 581, 592 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (automatic stay grants debtor time to enforce rights
in property under sections 722 and 524(c)).
97 See, e.g., In re Ballance, 33 Bankr. 89, 90-91 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983) (rejecting
argument that creditor was inadequately protected due to non-defaulting debtor's failure to
redeem or reaffirm); In re Rose, 21 Bankr. 272, 277-78 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (same); cf In
re Mitchell, 85 Bankr. 564, 565 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1988) (noting that debtor's continued contract
payments adequately protect creditor during automatic stay).
A surprising number of cases involving ipso facto clauses have arisen on creditor motions
to lift the stay. See, e.g., In re Peacock, 87 Bankr. 657, 657 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); Ballance,
33 Bankr. at 89; Rose, 21 Bankr. at 272. Typically, creditors have argued that the prospect of
a debtor's discharge, combined with the possibility that the debtor might default and that
the collateral might depreciate, entitles a creditor to relief from the stay and enforcement of
an ipso facto clause unless the debtor redeems or reaffirms. See, e.g., Ballance, 33 Bankr. at
89-90; Rose, 21 Bankr. at 272, 277-78. But, even a court that has held ipso facto clauses
enforceable has noted that such motions are premature, as one purpose of the automatic
stay is to provide debtors with the opportunity to decide whether to redeem or reaffirm. See
In re Morrow, 66 Bankr. 162, 163 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986). Moreover, it should be noted that
the risks that ipso facto clauses attempt to avert do not arise until the debtor has actually
received his or her discharge.
9' See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1988).
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the automatic stay is in effect, that smile might very well convey the
message that the creditor intends to enforce its ipso facto clause once
the stay is lifted.
B. Post-Discharge Concerns: Balancing Creditor Risk and the Debtor's
Fresh Start
Courts are sharply divided over whether ipso facto clauses are
enforceable after discharge. 99
 The Bankruptcy Code itself does not
address this precise issue.'"° Consequently, in considering whether
to enforce ipso facto clauses, most courts have focused on the policy
implications of enforcing such clauses. These courts have balanced
the risks that non-enforcement would pose to creditors against the
burdens that enforcement would impose on debtors. Ultimately, the
disagreements among the courts arise over which factors weigh
more heavily in the balance.
1. Ipso Facto Clauses and Debtor Burdens
The courts that have refused to enforce ipso facto clauses have
expressed their dissatisfaction with the options that ipso facto clauses
present to debtors. Some courts have noted that, although ipso facto
clauses attempt to force debtors to elect between redeeming, reaf-
firming or surrendering their liened property, most chapter 7 debt-
ors are financially unable to redeem in a lump-sum payment.'°'
Consequently, these courts point out that enforcing ipso facto clauses
has the practical effect of requiring debtors to choose between
reaffirming their debts or surrendering their liened property. 102
Allowing creditors to repossess, these courts hold, would penalize
99
 Compare In re Mitchell, 85 Bankr. 564, 565 (Bankr. I). Nev. 1988) ("[s]ubsequent to
abandonment and discharge, the creditor may enforce the literal terms of its contract") and
In re Sparago, 31 Bankr. 553, 554 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (ipso facto clause enforceable after
discharge) with In re Hughes, 95 Bankr. 20, 23 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989) (post-discharge
enforcement of ipso facto clause violates section 524(a)(2)) and Peacock, 87 Bankr. at 659 (ipso
facto clause unenforceable).
'D° A few courts have suggested that section 524(a)(2) precludes creditors from enforcing
ipso facto clauses after bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Hughes, 95 Bankr. at 23; In re Peacock, 87
Bankr. at 661 n.5; In re Brock, 23 Bankr. 998, 1002-03 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1982). Section
524(a)(2) does not preclude a creditor from enforcing its lien by proceeding in rem, however,
and thus these decisions have seemingly rested on findings that creditors' threats to proceed
in rem were actually attempts to impose personal liability on debtors as well.
'°' See, e.g., In re Winters, 69 Bankr. 145, 146 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986).
102 Id. at 146-47.
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debtors for filing bankruptcy. 10" Alternatively, requiring debtors to
reaffirm would be contrary to the spirit,' t)4 if not the letter, 105 of the
Bankruptcy Code.
For example, in the 1988 case of In re Peacock, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado reasoned that en-
forcing an ipso facto clause to require a non-defaulting debtor to
reaffirm would be contrary to the Bankruptcy Code's fresh start
policy."' In Peacock, the collateral at issue was the debtor's van.'° 7
The Peacocks were current on their loan payments and they sought
to retain the van by continuing their payments without reaffirming.
The creditor, on the other hand, sought to repossess the van unless
the debtors redeemed or reaffirmed.'"
The Peacock court addressed the reaffirmation alternative, ex-
pressing two concerns with this 'remedy. First, the court noted that,
in negotiating the terms of a reaffirmation, the Peacocks would be
in a weak bargaining position, as the creditor could reject any
reaffirmation proposal it found unacceptable.'" Indeed, the court
stated that the Peacocks would be at the "mercy" of the creditor in
negotiating a reaffirmation."° Second, the court reasoned that the
renewed personal liability that would result from the agreement
would "cloud" the Peacocks' fresh start if they were to default in
the future."' Thus, because requiring the Peacocks to reaffirm
would be contrary to the Code's fresh start policy, the court held
they could retain the van as long as they kept their contract pay-
ments current.
I" Id.; In re Rose, 21 Bankr. 272, 277 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982); see also Brock, 23 Bankr.
998, 1003 ("to permit repossession by sole reliance on (a] bankruptcy clause would in effect
result in a forfeiture, which courts of equity traditionally abhor").
14 See, e.g., Peacock, 87 Bankr. at 661 (forcing reaffirmation would "cloud" debtors' fresh
start); Winters, 69 Bankr, at 146-47 (enforcing ipso facto clause would threaten debtor's fresh
start).
'' See In re Hughes, 95 Bankr. 20, 23 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989) (post-discharge enforce-
ment of ipso facto clause violates section 542(a)(2)).
l°°1 87 Bankr. 657, 659, 661 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
1 ° 7 Id. at 657.
118 Id. In addition to relying on an ipso pao clause, the creditor in Peacock argued that
section 521(2)(A) required the debtors to redeem, reaffirm, or surrender the collateral. The
Peacock court rejected this argument, however, holding that section 52l(2)(A) is "essentially
procedural" and does not narrow a non-defaulting debtor's rights with respect to retaining
collateral. Id. at 658-60. For a discussion of section 521(2), see supra notes 54-65 and
accompanying text.
'"9
 Peacock, 87 Bankr. at 661.
Id,
LII Id.
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While the Peacock court held that requiring a non-defaulting
debtor to reaffirm would violate the Code's fresh start policy, the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New York held
in In re Hughes that a creditor's post-discharge attempt to enforce
an ipso facto clause violated the Bankruptcy Code itself." 2
 In Hughes,
the court held that a creditor's post-discharge attempt to enforce
an ipso facto clause violated section 524(a)(2)'s prohibition on actions
to collect repayment from a debtor of a debt that has been dis-
charged." 3
The debtor in Hughes sought to retain possession of his car, the
fair market value of which was $3,600 less than the outstanding
loan balance due to Chrysler Credit Corporation."4 Although
Hughes had remained current on his contract payments throughout
his bankruptcy proceeding, Chrysler invoked an ipso facto clause
and attempted to repossess the car after Hughes had been dis-
charged."3
 In response, Hughes petitioned the court to reopen his
discharge hearing so that he could take advantage of an earlier
reaffirmation agreement with Chrysler that he had subsequently
rescinded. "s
In addressing whether it was necessary for Hughes to reaffirm
in order to retain possession of the vehicle, the court questioned
Chrysler's motives for threatening to repossess. Noting that Chrys-
ler would suffer a loss if it actually repossessed the vehicle, and that
Chrysler had never claimed that the vehicle was depreciating faster
than the loan balance was being paid down, the court concluded
that Chrysler's specific intent in threatening to repossess was to
coerce Hughes into reaffirming the outstanding loan."' Employing
the clause for this purpose, the court reasoned, was akin to seeking
repayment from Hughes of his discharged obligations, an objective
specifically prohibited by the discharge provisions of section
524(a)(2). The court concluded that because repossession served no
economically sound purpose other than to obtain a reaffirmation
from Hughes, Chrysler could not rely on Hughes' bankruptcy filing
as a basis for declaring default." 8
"2
 95 Bankr. 20, 23 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989).
"3
 Id, at 23.
14 Id. at 21.
"3 Id. at 21-22.
" 6
 Id. at 22.
'" Id. at 23.
18 Id,
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In contrast to those courts that have found the Code remedies
unduly burdensome to debtors, at least one court has regarded the
availability of the Code remedies as a factor weighing in favor of
enforcing ipso facto clauses. In the 1982 case of In re Schweitzer, the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New
York held an ipso facto clause enforceable after noting that the
debtor had the option of reaffirming if he wished to retain the
liened property." 9 The court stated that although it might not
enforce ipso facto clauses in all instances, it would enforce such
clauses where doing so would not deprive a debtor of needed prop-
erty. 120
The debtor in Schweitzer had not defaulted on his car payments
to Chrysler Credit Corporation and he sought to retain possession
of his car by continuing his contract payments.' 2 ' Chrysler, on the
other hand, argued that Schweitzer had breached a default-upon-
filing clause in the parties' security agreement and therefore was
required to redeem in lump-sum, reaffirm the loan or surrender
the car.' 22
The Schweitzer court, which was addressing the issue prior to
the enactment of section 521(2), first determined that nothing in
the Bankruptcy Code required a non-defaulting debtor to exercise
a Code remedy in order to retain liened property.'" The court
stated that such a requirement could not be implied solely from the
existence of the Code remedies themselves. The court then rea-
soned that in the absence of a controlling Code provision the rights
of the parties were to be gleaned in the first instance from their
security agreement. In Schweitzer, the security agreement provided
that Chrysler could accelerate the loan and repossess the collateral
if Schweitzer filed bankruptcy. Thus, the issue became whether this
contract provision could be enforced.
In holding the ipso facto clause enforceable, the Schweitzer court
balanced the impact of enforcing the ipso facto clause against the
risks that non-enforcement would pose to Chrysler. The court noted
that enforcement in this instance would not necessarily deprive
ng 19 Banki. 860, 868 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
120 Id.
"I See id. at 864-65. Schweitzer had originally sought to continue his contract payments
until he had paid the vehicle's $5,000 redemption value. The court rejected this payment
proposal, however, holding that installment redemption is impermissible in chapter 7 pro-
ceedings. See id. at 861-64.
122 See id. at 866-67.
123
 Id. at 865.
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Schweitzer of his car because he still had the option of redeeming
or reaffirming. 124 On the other hand, the court noted that, if it
refused to enforce the ipso facto clause, Chrysler would be exposed
to the risk that its collateral would rapidly depreciate after dis-
charge. 125 The court concluded that it would enforce the ipso facto
clause provided that Chrysler did not unreasonably withhold its
consent if Schweitzer offered to reaffirm.' 2" Thus, the Schweitzer
court concluded that it was not unduly burdensome to require a
non-defaulting debtor to reaffirm.
Although the Schweitzer decision turned on the fact that the
debtor had the option of reaffirming, another bankruptcy court has
noted that section 524(c) reaffirmation is not the only option avail-
able to debtors who cannot afford to redeem in lump-sum. In the
1982 case of In re Whately, the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Ohio noted that debtors have the option
of converting to a chapter 13 case as well.' 27 In chapter 13 pro-
ceedings, debtors have the option of redeeming in installments
without obtaining creditor consent.' 28 The Whately court noted this
option in concluding that a creditor that refused to enter into a
reaffirmation agreement could nevertheless enforce an ipso facto
clause.' 29
In Whately, the debtor was employed as a meat wrapper, a job
that provided the sole means of support for herself and her child.' 3°
Whately worked as a "floater" in a three-county area, substituting
part-time for other employees who were sick or unable to work.
Her car was a necessity to her employment.
At the time she filed bankruptcy, Whately was current on her
contract payments to the bank.' 3 ' In addition, she maintained col-
lision and property damage insurance on the vehicle, as well as
credit life and disability insurance, which would protect the bank if
Whately became ill, disabled or if she died. Nevertheless, the cred-
itor, BancOhio, sought to enforce an ipso facto clause to repossess
the vehicle unless Whately redeemed. BancOhio refused to enter
124 Id. at 868.
125 Id.
1211 Id.
122 16 Baran 394, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
12° I I U.S.C. §1 1325(a)(5), I322(c), and 1328(a) (1988). For a discussion of Chapter 13
installment redemption, see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
12" Whately, 16 Bankr. 394, 398.
"" Id. at 395.
Id.
May 1991]	 IPSO FACTO CLAUSES IN CHAPTER 7	 725
into a reaffirmation agreement because it was against the bank's
policy to enter into reaffirmations with chapter 7 debtors.
In an attempt to retain possession of her car, Whately peti-
tioned the court for an order to allow her to continue her payments
pursuant to the original installment contract. The court denied her
request, however, reasoning that, because section 524(c) contem-
plates a voluntary agreement, the court could not order BancOhio
to agree to a reaffirmation. 132 Alternatively, section 722 redemption
required a lump-sum payment, a requirement that Whately's pro-
posed payment plan did not satisfy.'" The court stated that if
Whately wished to pay the vehicle's fair market value in installments
she could have filed a petition under chapter 13. 1 " But by filing
chapter 7, the court reasoned, Whately was bound by the require-
ments of section 722 and section 524(c). 1 " Thus, the court con-
cluded that unless Whately exercised her right to redeem in lump-
sum, or unless she converted to a chapter 13 proceeding, BancOhio
would be permitted to enforce its ipso facto clause and repossess the
vehicle."6
2. Ipso Facto Clauses and Creditor Risk
In addition to disagreeing whether ipso facto clauses impose
undue burdens on debtors, courts have also disagreed whether
allowing non-defaulting debtors to retain collateral without redeem-
ing or reaffirming poses undue risks to creditors. The courts that
have refused to enforce ipso facto clauses have regarded the risks
that accompany the loss of a debtor's personal liability as minimal.
Some courts have noted that the prospect that a non-defaulting
debtor will suddenly default or waste the creditor's collateral after
discharge is entirely speculative."' Other courts have noted that, if
a default were to occur, the creditor would be entitled to repossess
its collateral immediately.'" Finally, some courts have reasoned that
132 See id. at 395-97.
05 See id. at 395-96..
131 Id. at 397,
I" Id.
i'" See id. at 398.
132 See, e.g., Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1989)
(labeling creditor's arguments concerning the risks that the continued contract payment
option presents as "speculative"); In re Belanger, 118 Bankr. 368, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990)
("It is doubtful that a debtor would fail to insure or maintain [collateral] , simply because
he no longer has personal liability for the underlying debt.").
18 See, e.g., In re Ballance, 33 Bankr. 89, 91 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983); In re Brock, 23
Bankr. 998, 1004 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1982).
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any loss that a creditor suffers as a result of depreciation of its
collateral is simply a risk of doing business, a risk for which creditors
can compensate by charging higher interest rates or requiring larger
down-payments.' 39
In contrast, courts that have enforced ipso facto clauses have
cited creditor risk as their primary reason for doing so."° These
courts have reasoned that a debtor's continued contract payments
only serve to provide adequate protection for a creditor's interest
in its collateral prior to discharge."' According to these courts, after
a debtor's discharge has been granted the continued contract pay-
ment option exposes creditors to risks that warrant the enforcement
of ipso facto clauses.' 42
Indeed, some courts have indicated that, absent redemption or
reaffirmation by a debtor, a creditor can declare a default upon
discharge even in the absence of an ipso facto clause. 143 For example,
"9 See, e.g., In re Peacock, 87 Bankr. 657, 660 (Bankr. D. Cob. 1988); In re Berenguer,
77 Bankr. 959, 970 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Winters, 69 Bankr. 145, 147 (Bankr. D. Or.
1986); In re Cassell, 41 Bankr. 737, 741 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984); In re Brock, 23 Bankr. at
1003.
140 See, e.g., In re Mitchell, 85 Bankr. 564, 566 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1988) (thing the possibility
of depreciation or destruction of creditor's collateral as basis for enforcing ipso facto clause);
In re Sparago, 31 Bankr. 552, 554 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("In view of the depreciating value
of the security and the possibility of its total destruction or disappearance ... the right of
repossession is not one which should be lightly denied.").
See, e.g., Mitchell, 85 Bankr. at 565 (the concept of adequate protection does not apply
once the stay is terminated); In re Morrow, 66 Bankr. 162, 163 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (same);
see also Sparago, 31 Bankr. at 554 (finding that adequate protection would be lacking if debtor
were permitted to retain collateral after discharge without redeeming or reaffirming).
142 See Mitchell, 85 Bankr. at 565 (enforcing ipso facto clause); In re Morrow, 66 Bankr.
162, 163 (Bankr, D. Nev. 1986) (same); Sparago, 31 Bankr. at 554 (same).
Jo In the 1983 case of General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell the Sixth Circuit indicated
that a creditor could declare a default after a debtor's discharge based on a security agreement
provision that stated "[debtor] shall be liable for a deficiency." 700 F.2d 1053, 1058 (6th Cir.
1983). The court indicated that a discharge of the debtor's personal liability through bank-
ruptcy "constructively vitiated" the parties' security agreement by negating the creditor's
right to seek personal liability against the debtor. See id.
Similarly, in the 1984 case of In re Kunstler, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Middle District of Louisianna stated in dicta that a creditor can declare a default after a
debtor's discharge regardless of whether the debtor has remained current on his or her
contract payments. See 38 Bankr. 207, 209-10 (1984). The Kunstler court indicated that the
right to seek personal liability against a debtor is implied in virtually every installment loan
secured by property and that the loss of this right is a sufficient basis for declaring a default.
See id. at 210. The court reasoned that allowing a debtor to retain collateral after discharge
without personal liablity would would raise !`serious constitutional problems" because it would
place the creditor in "a very precarious position . . . and one to which [it] did not agree or
contract." Id.
Significantly, both the Bell and Kunstler courts addressed the enforceability of ipso facto
clauses. In Bell, the court indicated that the creditor in that case could rely on an ipso facto
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in the 1989 case of In re Whitaker, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee indicated that a creditor
could declare a default upon discharge notwithstanding that the
debtors had remained current on their contract payments.'" The
court stated that it would be "wholly inequitable" to permit the
debtors' to retain the creditor's collateral by continuing their pay-
ments without personal liability.' 45
In Whitaker, the collateral at issue was the debtors' car, the fair
market value of which exceeded the loan balance by $1,000. The
debtors were current on their loan payments and they sought to
retain the car by simply keeping their contract payments current.
The Whitaker court rejected the debtor's proposed payment scheme,
however, reasoning in part that, upon receiving their discharge, the
debtors would be in default of a provision in their security agree-
ment which specifically contemplated that they would be liable if
they defaulted on their loan." 6 The court indicated that this default
would empower the creditor to repossess its collateral."'
In addition to finding that the debtors would be in default
upon receiving their discharge, the Whitaker also noted that, if the
debtors were permitted to retain the car by continuing their contract
payments, the debtors would not only enjoy the benefits of dis-
charge, they would enjoy "unhindered" use of the creditor's collat-
eral as well. 14" The creditor would be exposed to risk, the court
reasoned, because the debtors could fail to maintain the car, or
could subject it to improper use, and they would not be responsible
for any resultant depreciation if they later defaulted on their pay-
ments. In the meantime, the court observed, the creditor could do
nothing but wait for a default. Moreover, the court pointed out that
clause as an alternative basis for declaring a default. See Bell, 700 F.2d at 1057-58. In Kunstler,
the court stated that ipso facto clauses are unenforceable in bankruptcy but that a creditor
can declare a default solely on the basis of a debtor's discharge. See Kunstler, 38 Bankr. at
209-10.
Strictly speaking, there is some basis for distinguishing between ipso facto clauses and
contract provisions that allow creditors to declare a default at discharge. Ipso facto clauses
designate the debtor's bankruptcy filing, as opposed to the debtor's bankruptcy discharge, as
the relevant event of default. Given that the Code precludes creditors from enforcing ipso
facto clauses prior to discharge, however, and given that the risks that ipso facto clauses attempt
to avert do not arise until a debtor has been discharged, the two types of contract provisions
are, as a practical matter, virtually the same.
144 85 Bankr. 788, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988).
1" Id.
"6 Id.
' 4' See id.
148 Id.
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if a default were eventually to occur the creditor would be left to
salvage what, if anything, remained of its collateral. In order to
avert these risks, the Whitaker court concluded that the debtors must
redeem or reaffirm in order to retain the car after discharge. 149
In sum, courts are divided over whether ipso facto clauses are
contrary to the policies of the Bankruptcy Code. The courts that
have refused to enforce such clauses have expressed dissatisfaction
with the Code remedies that the clauses attempt to trigger. In
addition, these courts have regarded the risks that ipso facto clauses
attempt to avert as insubstantial. In contrast, the courts that have
enforced ipso facto clauses have done so primarily because of the
risks that creditors would otherwise be forced to endure. These
courts have also reasoned that the availability of the Code remedies
mitigates any burdens to debtors that ipso facto clauses might oth-
erwise impose.
IV. ANALYSIS OF NON-DEFAULTING DEBTORS' OPTIONS IN CHAPTER
7 PROCEEDINGS
"A debtor having filed bankruptcy has not committed a cardinal
sin" declared the court in In re Ballance.' 5° Certainly, few would
contest this sentiment. But a debtor's bankruptcy filing does have
consequences for the debtor's pre-petition creditors, consequences
that in most instances are governed by the Bankruptcy Code. The
first issue that ipso facto clauses raise is whether the Bankruptcy
Code already requires what the clauses attempt to accomplish.
A. Code Requirements
Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code is titled "Debtor's du-
ties."''' In subsection (2), section 521 provides that a debtor in
possession of liened collateral "(A) shall file . . . a statement of his
[or her] intention with respect to the retention and surrender of
such property and, if applicable, specifying that such property is
claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem such property,
or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such prop-
erty. "152
One possible construction of section 521(2)(A) is that it sets
forth two independent requirements. First, every debtor is required
1 " See id. at 793-94.
190
 33 Bankr. 89,91 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983).
01
 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988).
I" Id. § 521(2)(A).
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to file a statement of intention specifying whether he or she intends
to retain or surrender his or her liened property. Second, if the
debtor intends to claim the property as exempt, redeem the prop-
erty or reaffirm the debt, the debtor is also required to specify this
intention. The bankruptcy court in In re Belanger' 53 construed sec-
tion 521(2)(A) in this manner and several other courts have ad-
vanced this construction as well.' 54
One problem with the Belanger court's construction of section
521(2), however, is that it leaves unanswered why a debtor who
intends to retain liened property is only required to indicate how
he or she intends to do so in three limited instances. If section
521(2) is essentially a notice requirement, as the Belanger court
concluded it is, 155 one would expect that a debtor would be required
to notify the creditor of what remedy he or she intends to pursue
in all instances, not only when he or she intends to redeem, reaffirm
or claim the property as exempt.
An additional problem with the Belanger court's construction
of section 521(2) arises under subparagraph (B), which provides
that within forty-five clays of filing a statement of intention under
subparagraph (A) the debtor must perform his or her stated inten-
tion.r43 If the Belanger court is correct that only those debtors who
intend to redeem, reaffirm or claim the property as exempt are
required to specify this intention under subparagraph (A), it would
follow that only these debtors would be required to perform their
stated intention under subparagraph (B). Thus, under the Belanger
court's construction of section 521(2), non-defaulting debtors would
not only be excused from having to notify creditors of their specific
intentions, they would be excused from having to perform them as
well.
An alternative construction of section 52I(2)(A) is that the sec-
tion first requires a debtor to elect between retaining or surrender-
ing his or her liened property. Then, if the debtor chooses to retain
the property, the debtor must choose between one of the remedies
I" See 118 Bankr. 368, 369-70, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990). For a discussion of Belanger,
see supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text
154 See, e.g., In re Hunter, 121 Bankr. 609, 612 (Bankr, S.D. Ala. 1990); In re Crouch,
104 Bankr. 770, 771-72 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1989); see also In re Peacock, 87 Bankr. 657, 660
(Bankr. 1). Cob. 1988) ("The words 'if applicable' in section 521(2)(A) do not narrow the
rights or options of a non-defaulting debtor with respect to collateral."); In re Winters, 69
Bankr. 145, 147 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1986) ("The 'if applicable' language in [section 521(2)(A)]
destroys the argument that Congress [restricted a non-defaulting debtor's options] , . ."),
in Belanger, 118 Bankr. at 370.
"6 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(B) (1988).
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set forth in section 521(2)(A), i.e., redeeming, reaffirming or claim-
ing the property as exempt. In other words, under this construction,
the options listed in subparagraph (A) are exclusive and are "ap-
plicable" whenever a debtor elects to retain liened collateral. A
number of courts have construed section 521(2) in this manner,
including the Seventh Circuit in In re Edwards.' 57
The Edwards court's construction of section 521(2) avoids the
problems that arise under the Belanger court's approach but it en-
counters one problem of its own. Subparagraph (C) of section
521(2) provides that nothing in subparagraphs (A) or (B) affects a
debtor's rights with respect to his or her liened propertyl' 58
 Thus,
although subparagraphs (A) and (B) seem to contemplate that a
debtor who intends to retain collateral must redeem or reaffirm in
order to do so, subparagraph (C) prevents this expectation from
rising to the level of a substantive requirement. In other words,
because subparagraph (C) expressly states that section 521(2) does
not affect a debtor's rights to his or her liened property, section
521(2) cannot correctly be construed as imposing conditions on a
debtor's right to retain such property. Therefore, the Edwards
court's conclusion that section 521(2) requires chapter 7 debtors to
exercise a Code remedy in order to retain liened property after
bankruptcy appears to be incorrect.
In sum, although subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 521(2)
suggest that redemption and reaffirmation are a chapter 7 debtor's
only options for retaining liened collateral after bankruptcy, sub-
paragraph (C) does not permit the conclusion that section 521(2)
itself limits a debtor to these Code remedies. Thus, although the
Belanger court's construction of subparagraphs (A) and (B) is some-
what suspect, the Belanger court's conclusion that section 521(2) does
not preclude non-defaulting debtors from pursuing the continued
contract payment option appears to be correct. This conclusion
leaves unanswered, however, whether the continued contract pay-
ment option is consistent with the other sections of the Code.
Two Code sections that courts seemingly have overlooked in
considering whether to permit debtors to pursue the continued
contract payment option are sections 101(4) and section 502(b).
Section 101(4) defines a bankruptcy "claim." 15" That section pro-
' See Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Chavarria, 117 Bankr. 582,
584 (Bankr. a Idaho 1990). For a discussion of Edwards, see supra notes 59-65 and accom-
panying text.
'" 11	 § 521(2)(C) (1988).
159 Id. § 104.
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vides that a "claim" is a "right to payment, whether or not such
right is . . . matured . . ." 6° In turn, section 502 provides that
unrnatured claims are recoverable in bankruptcy.' 6 ' These Code
provisions are significant because they suggest that, regardless of
whether a debtor has defaulted on an outstanding installment loan,
the debtor's bankruptcy filing itself triggers the creditor's claim.' 62
This conclusion is in turn significant because, as the district court
noted in In re Hart, to the extent that the creditor's claim is secured
by collateral, the Code undertakes to safeguard the value of that
claim.' 63 The continued contract payment option, however, threat-
ens to undermine this objective.
The continued contract payment option presents the same risks
to creditors as the installment redemption payment scheme that is
impermissible in chapter 7 proceedings. 164 Indeed, the sole distinc-
tion between the two payment schemes is that the installment re-
demption scheme contemplates payments in the amount of the
redemption value of the collateral, i.e., the lesser of the value of
the collateral or the amount of the creditor's claim, whereas the
continued contract payment scheme contemplates payments equal-
ing the remaining balance due under the contract. 165 Both payment
schemes contemplate payment schedules that extend beyond dis-
charge. Consequently, both payment schemes expose the secured
creditor to the risk that, if the debtor's installment payments fail to
keep pace with the depreciation of the creditor's collateral, the
m Id. § 104(A).
u" See id. § 502(b)(1) (1988),
101 This conclusion is further supported by the legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Code. The House Report specifies that "bankruptcy operates as the acceleration of the
principal amount of all claims against the debtor." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
353 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Com; CONG. Se ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6309.
' 63 For a further discussion of Hart, see supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text. As
the Hart court noted, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code supports the conclusion
that Congress sought to safeguard the value of secured claims in bankruptcy. See In re Hart,
8 Bankr. 1020, 1022 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). The House Report states that "once the secured
claim is determined, the court must insure that the holder of the claim is adequately protected.
The secured creditor is entitled to realize his claim, and not have his collateral eroded by
delay or use by the estate." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 181 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. News 5963, 6141.
I" For a discussion of the risks that installment redemption poses to creditors, see supra
notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
in No court has articulated this distinction, but in In re Avia the Bankruptcy Panel for
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the difference between installment redemption and the
continued contract payment option. See In re Avia, 83 Bankr. 6, 7-8 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that installment redemption is impermissible in chapter 7 proceedings but stating
that continued contract payments option is permissible).
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creditor's recovery upon default will be less than if it had been
permitted to realize on its security at the time of the debtor's bank-
ruptcy. Thus, there is a strong basis for concluding that, like in-
stallment redemption, the continued contract payment option is
inconsistent with Congress's objective of safeguarding the value of
secured claims in bankruptcy. Unfortunately, however, few courts
have explored this line of reasoning. Rather, due to the prevalence
of ipso facto clauses, most courts have focused on whether creditors
can foreclose the continued contract payment option by enforcing
ipso facto clauses.
B. The Enforceability of Ipso Facto Clauses
The Bankruptcy Code clearly precludes creditors from enforc-
ing ipso facto clauses during the administration of a debtor's bank-
ruptcy case.' 66
 But, the Code does not expressly preclude creditors
from enforcing ipso facto clauses after discharge.' 67 Thus, the issue
ultimately presented by ipso facto clauses is whether they are contrary
to the policies of the Bankruptcy Code.
Given that the Bankruptcy Code itself is "an attempt to balance
the interests of debtors and creditors," 168 any decision whether to
enforce ipso facto clauses must take into account the interests of both
creditors and debtors. For the secured creditor, the interest that an
ipso facto clause attempts to further is the creditor's interest in safe-
guarding the value of its secured claim. For the debtor, the interest
at stake is the fresh start that bankruptcy is intended to provide.
Congress has recognized both interests as significant.' 69
It is clear that the continued contract payment option poses
significant risks to creditors. Moreover, these risks are not simply,
as some courts have suggested, "ordinary risks of doing business,"'"
at least not in the sense that they are risks that creditors bargain
for when entering into a contract with a debtor. Although it is true
166
 See supra notes 79-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Code barriers
to pre-discharge enforcement of ipso facto clauses.
167
 See supra note 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
16" In re Chavarria, 117 Bankr. 582, 589 (Bankr. a Idaho 1990).
169
 The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code is replete with references to the
Code's fresh start policy. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 117- 18 (1977),
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 6078 (1978) (essence of modern bank-
ruptcy taw is fresh start for the debtor; the Code ensures that bankruptcy will provide the
debtor a fresh start). Similarly, the legislative history also highlights the importance of
safeguarding the value of a secured creditor's claim in bankruptcy. See supra note 163 for a
discussion of this legislative history.
170 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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that a creditor that secures an installment loan with depreciable
collateral bargains For the risk that its collateral will depreciate over
the course of the loan, the creditor enters this bargain with the
expectation that, in the event of default, it will have the right to
pursue the debtor for any deficiency. After the debtor has received
his or her discharge in bankruptcy, however, the creditor is pre-
cluded from recovering any deficiency that results from the collat-
eral's depreciation. Thus, the risks of depreciation after discharge
are qualitatively different from the risks of depreciation a creditor
would otherwise face." Consequently, creditors certainly have a
legitimate reason for attempting to enforce ipso facto clauses.
Balanced against the risks that the continued contract option
presents to creditors are the burdens that ipso facto clauses impose
on debtors. Some courts, such as the bankruptcy court in In re
Peacock,"2 have suggested that requiring a non-defaulting debtor
to resort to the Code remedies tends to frustrate the debtor's fresh
start.'" This view is hard to reconcile, however, with the fact that
the Code remedies are the very means by which Congress envi-
sioned debtors would obtain a fresh start.'"
The Peacock court's concern apparently sterns from the fact
that, because most debtors are financially unable to redeem in a
lump-sum payment, section 524(c) reaffirmation is the only viable
remedy in chapter 7 proceedings. Indeed, the Peacock court ex-
pressed two concerns with the reaffirmation remedy. First, the court
reasoned that the renewed personal liability .that would result from
a reaffirmation would cloud the debtors' fresh start. 15 Second, the
court stated that enforcing an ipso facto clause would place the
debtors at the "mercy" of the creditor in negotiating a reaffirma-
tion.' 7" Both concerns warrant further analysis.
Although it is true that, by reaffirming a dischargeable debt
(and thereby undertaking renewed personal liability), a debtor loses
the benefits of discharge, this burden is simply a trade-off the debtor
'" See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v, Bell, 700 F,2d 1053, 1056 n.4 (6th Cir, 1983)
(noting that, although creditors typically fitce the risks of depreciation and default even in
the absence of a debtor's bankruptcy filing, the debtor's discharge changes the nature of
these risks).
171
 For a discussion of the Peacock case, see supra notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
l " See, e.g., Ind re Peacock, 87 Bankr. 657, 659, 661 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); In re Winters,
69 Bankr. 145, 146-47•(Bankr. D. Or. 1986).
174 See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS, 5787, 5793 (indicating that section 722's redemption remedy was added to
the Code to aid debtors'in obtaining a fresh start).
175 See Peacock, 87 Bankr. at 661.
176 Id.	 • -
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must make for the privilege of paying a creditor for its collateral in
installments, Congress expressly sanctioned this sort of trade-off
when it enacted section 524(c). Moreover, given that most consumer
borrowers are expected to pledge personal liability on their install-
ment loans, there is no reason to believe that requiring the same
concession from discharged debtors is unfair. Even the Commission
on Bankruptcy Laws, which opposed reaffirmations, recognized
that such a trade-off is equitable. The Commission's proposed in-
stallment scheme, which was to serve as a substitute for reaffirma-
tions, specifically contemplated that debtors would be personally
liable for their installment payments after discharge)" Thus, the
Peacock court's suggestion that renewed personal liability is contrary
to the fresh start is misplaced.
The Peacock court's second concern, that enforcing ipso facto
clauses places debtors at the "mercy" of creditors in negotiating
reaffirmations, raises more difficult issues. To the extent that the
court was concerned that enforcing ipso facto clauses would expose
debtors to creditor over-reaching in negotiating reaffirmations, this
concern is also somewhat misplaced. Section 524(c) itself provides
several safeguards to ensure that debtors do not enter into unduly
burdensome reaffirmation agreements. 178 Moreover, debtors are
not without a bargaining chip of their own when negotiating reaf-
firmations. Specifically, a debtor can threaten that, if the creditor
does not negotiate in good faith, the debtor will surrender the
collateral and thereby burden the creditor with the task of finding
another buyer. Most creditors would likely prefer to deal fairly with
a paying customer rather than risk entering the business of selling
second-hand property.
But, although there is little basis for the concern that debtors
will fall victim to creditor over-reaching in negotiating reaffirma-
tions, debtors are at the "mercy" of creditors in another sense.
Specifically, a debtor has no guarantee that a creditor will agree to
a reaffirmation at all. Consequently, a debtor might be entirely
willing to enter into a reaffirmation agreement but nevertheless
suffer repossession at the hands of an unwilling creditor. Thus, the
remaining issue presented by ipso facto clauses is whether courts
should enforce such clauses when a creditor refuses to reaffirm.
177 See COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 27, pt. II, at 131. For the text of the Commis-
sion's proposed section 4-504(b) see supra note 30.
In See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1988). For a discussion of section 524(c)'s safeguards see supra
note 36b and accompanying text.
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In In re Schweitzer, the bankruptcy court suggested a flexible
approach to enforcing ipso facto clauses.'" In that case the court
enforced an ipso facto clause but indicated that it might not do so in
situations where a creditor unreasonably refuses to reaffirm.'" At
first glance, this approach appears to be an equitable resolution to
the ipso facto clause debate, as the approach ensures that debtors
are able to retain their liened collateral while, at the same time,
ensuring that creditors are not exposed to risk. There are, however,
two problems with the Schweitzer court's approach.
First, the Schweitzer approach would require courts to monitor
reaffirmation negotiations to assess the "reasonableness" of a cred-
itor's negotiating position. Congress, however, amended section
524(c) to reduce courts' participation in overseeing reaffirma-
tions.' 81 Second, and more importantly, the Schweitzer court's ap-
proach requires creditors to relinquish one right in order to protect
another. Section 524(c) contemplates that creditors can refuse to
enter into reaffirmation agreements for whatever reason they see
fit.' 82 The Schweitzer court approach would, in effect, nullify the
voluntary nature of section 524(c).
The Schweitzer court is not the only court that has addressed
whether ipso facto clauses should be enforced when a creditor refuses
to reaffirm. In In re Whately, the bankruptcy court directly con-
fronted a situation in which a debtor sought to retain her automo-
bile by reaffirming, but was unable to obtain the creditor's con-
sent."3
 The creditor's refusal to reaffirm in that case appears to
have been particularly unreasonable given that Whately was current
on her payments, she maintained collision and credit life insurance
on the vehicle, and she needed the car to support her family.
Nevertheless, the court permitted the creditor to enforce an ipso
facto clause to repossess its collateral. 1 e" The court indicated that, if
Whately was financially unable to redeem in a lump-sum payment,
and if she was unable to obtain the creditor's consent to a reaffir-
mation, she should have filed a chapter 13 case where she could
redeem in installments over the objection of the creditor.'"
179 For a discussion of Schweitzer see supra notes 119-126 and accompanying text.
180 See In re Schweitzer, 19 Bankr. 860, 868 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
L81 For a discussion of this amendment, see supra note 36.
182 See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell, 700 F.2d 1053, 1056 (6th Cir. 1983)
r[section] 524(c) envisions execution of an 'agreement' which, by definition is a voluntary
undertaking").
00 For a discussion of Whately, see supra notes 127-136 and accompanying text.
I" See In re Whately, 16 Bankr. 394, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
199 Id. at 397.
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Although the Whalely decision may appear somewhat harsh, the
court's approach was ultimately correct. In choosing to file a chapter
7 proceeding, a debtor has notice of the Code remedies that are
available for retaining liened collateral. The fact that a creditor
exercises its rights under one of these Code remedies is not a
sufficient reason for permitting a debtor to pursue the continued
contract payment option. Debtors who are unable, or unwilling, to
redeem or reaffirm can convert to a chapter 13 proceeding. Cred-
itors should not be penalized for a debtor's unwillingness to resort
to these Code options.
Thus, in sum, creditors are justified in enforcing ipso facto
clauses. Given that section 101(4) of the Bankruptcy Code itself
indicates that a debtor's bankruptcy filing triggers a creditor's
claim, 186
 ipso facto clauses appear to do little more than what the
Code already contemplates. The Bankruptcy Code provides several
means by which debtors can retain their liened property after bank-
ruptcy. Although these Code remedies may be imperfect, they more
equitably balance the interests of creditors and debtors than the
continued contract payment option, which only accounts for the
interests of debtors.
V. PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Litigation concerning ipso facto clauses reveals two voids in the
Bankruptcy Code. First, the Code is not clear whether the Code
remedies are the exclusive means by which a debtor can retain
liened property after bankruptcy. Second, the Code remedies them-
selves do not adequately serve the interests of debtors. Congress
could avert a significant amount of litigation by making two simple
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.
First, Congress could amend section 521(2) to make it clear
that the Code remedies are the exclusive means by which a debtor
can retain liened property after bankruptcy. This amendment could
be accomplished by striking subsection 2(C) of section 521(2), which
provides that nothing in section 521(2) affects a debtor's rights to
his or her liened property, and inserting language indicating that
the options listed in subsection 2(A) are exclusive.'" This amend-
' 86 See 11 U.S.C.
	 101(4) (1988).
187
 Of course, this amendment would substantially alter the meaning Of section 521(2)(C)
because that section currently provides that nothing in subparagraphs (A) or (B) of that
section affects a debtor's rights to his or her liened property. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(C) (1988).
The magnitude of this change, however, is hard to determine. The purpose of section
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meat would put an end to any confusion regarding whether section
521(2) is mandatory and, moreover, this amendment would ensure
that a debtor's options in bankruptcy are not dependent on the
presence or absence of an ipso facto clause.
In addition to amending section 521(2), Congress could also
amend section 524(c) to grant debtors who have not defaulted on
an outstanding installment contract the right to reaffirm that con-
tract at the original contract terms. Under this amendment, a debtor
would still be free to redeem in lump-sum, or to negotiate a more
favorable reaffirmation, but the debtor could fall back on the reaf-
firmation right if the other remedies proved unfruitful. Moreover,
although this amendment would eliminate the consensual aspect of
the present reaffirmation provision, creditors would have no basis
for objection because they would continue to receive the same con-
tract terms, as well as the debtor's accompanying personal liability,
that they enjoyed prior to bankruptcy. 188 In short, under this pro-
posed amendment, creditors and debtors would be able to proceed
as if the debtor had not filed bankruptcy at all.
CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Code is unclear whether the Code remedies
of redemption or reaffirmation are the exclusive means by which
chapter 7 debtors can retain liened collateral after bankruptcy.
Creditors have responded to this ambiguity in the Code by attempt-
ing to enforce ipso facto clauses to place non-defaulting debtors in
default upon entering bankruptcy. Some courts have strongly op-
posed such clauses, indicating that they are contrary to the spirit, if
not the letter, of the Bankruptcy Code.
Ipso facto clauses, however, attempt to do no more than ensure
that debtors utilize the remedies set forth by Congress for retaining
liened collateral after bankruptcy. This objective can hardly be con-
sidered contrary to the policies of the Bankruptcy Code. Conse-
quently, given the risks that the continued contract payment alter-
native presents to creditors, creditors are justified in enforcing ipso
facto clauses.
521(2)(C) is somewhat of a mystery and, as several courts have noted, the legislative history
is "woefully inadequate." See In re Belanger, 118 Bankr. 368, 371 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990).
"" By obtaining a reaffirmation a creditor is actually in a better position than it occupied
prior to bankruptcy because, after the debtor has been discharged, the debtor is precluded
from obtaining another discharge within six years. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(8) (1988). Moreover,
once the debtor has.been discharged for other pre-petition debts, the debtor's ability to make
the payments under the reaffirmation agreement might actually be enhanced.
738	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:703
Regardless of their enforceability, the litigation that ipso facto
clauses have prompted highlights some weaknesses in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Congress could address these weaknesses by clarifying
the options available to chapter 7 debtors and perhaps by providing
non-defaulting debtors with a reaffirmation right as well. These
amendments would ensure that all post-discharge marriages be-
tween debtors and creditors are indeed happy.
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